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Guantanamo Forever: United States Sovereignty
and the Unending State of Exception
STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE
PRESIDENT-AND WON. By Brandt Goldstein. New York: Scribner. 2005.
Pp. 384. $26.00 (cloth).
Reviewed by Mary Anne Franks*
No sacrifice is too great for our democracy, least of all the tem-
porary sacrifice of democracy itself.
-Clinton L. Rossiter'
The name Guantanamo Bay is now inextricably linked with images
of shackled men in orange jumpsuits and black hoods, with the designa-
tion of "enemy combatants," and with the uncertain, possibly severe vio-
lence to which they are subjected. The camps, in their strange positioning
between the rule of law and utter lawlessness, stand for the outer limit of
U.S. sovereign power. Guantanamo functions as this limit in two simul-
taneous but paradoxical senses. The camps at Guantanamo are first and
foremost a creation of the United States, and those detained there are held
pursuant to the exercise of American sovereign power. At the same time,
however, the U.S. government asserts that American courts have no juris-
diction, and U.S. laws do not apply, in Guantanamo. Guantanamo is thus
a kind of no man's land where traditional conceptions of human rights do
not exist, and where U.S. sovereign power is allegedly impotent to guar-
antee the basic human rights that are the cornerstone of democracy.
The government has attempted to justify the extraordinary measures
taken at Guantanamo-the tactics employed in capturing and keeping the
prisoners, the creation of "enemy combatant" status, the use of torture or
other questionable measures in extracting information from the prisoners,
the denial of due process, and the trying of prisoners by military com-
missions rather than full courts-as necessary responses to an extraordi-
nary situation: a post-September 11 world facing imminent danger from
a shadowy and powerful enemy. In short, the U.S. government has justified
the paradox of Guantanamo through the invocation of the state of emer-
gency, or what Carl Schmitt called the state of exception.' The dark and
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paradoxical dimension of the state of exception, as theorists such as
Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Zilek have pointed out, is that the state of
exception, which is meant to be a temporary provisional suspension of
the norm, often instead becomes the norm-the law-itself. As Agamben
writes, "[Tihe state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law
of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it
defines law's threshold or limit concept."3 The consequences of this per-
petual state of exception for the democratic project are becoming brutally
clear in light of the seemingly endless "war on terror."
But as Brandt Goldstein's book, Storming the Court: How a Group
of Yale Law School Students Sued the President-and Won,4 vividly de-
scribes, Guantanamo Bay was already a legal no-man's land grounded in
a state of exception back in 1991, when Haitian refugees fleeing persecu-
tion were taken from their makeshift boats and detained in a tiny corner
of Cuba. The historical background of that phenomenon is somewhat
complex: in 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order authoriz-
ing the Coast Guard to interdict boats carrying Haitians toward the United
States and giving the Coast Guard the power to immediately return the
Haitians to their country. This order was based on an agreement between
the Reagan administration and the Haitian dictator Jean-Claude "Baby
Doc" Duvalier (p. 18). This was the only agreement of this kind that the
United States had with any country (p. 18). President Reagan stated in a
formal proclamation that fleeing Haitians "threatened the welfare and
safety" of the United States.' However, this order expressly forbade the
return of any Haitian who was a refugee. This was in keeping with the
foundational principle of immigration law known as "non-return" or "non-
refoulement" (p. 18). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, which the United States ratified, held that "[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. '6 One of the specters that haunted the
United States' ratification of this Convention was an incident involving a
ship called the St. Louis. In June of 1939, the St. Louis, carrying 900 Jewish
refugees fearing for their lives, was turned away by both the United States
and Canada (p. 28). With nowhere to go for refuge, the ship and its in-
(1922).
3 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 4 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press
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4 BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS
SUED THE PRESIDENT -AND WON (2005).
5 Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (Sept. 29, 1981).
6 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, adopted July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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habitants were forced to return to Nazi Germany, where all but a handful
of the passengers were killed (p. 28).
The U.S. government's formal attempt to comport with the Conven-
tion was motivated in part by this disturbing history. The administration,
through what was then called the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), sent officers to the Coast Guard cutters to conduct interviews to de-
termine which Haitians qualified as refugees. Between 1981 and 1991, the
INS rejected 99.9% of the Haitians picked up by the Coast Guard on the
high seas. Out of 23,000 Haitians interviewed during this time, only twenty-
eight were brought to the United States. At the same time, the United States
accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees from other countries (p. 18).
The popular and democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide was
toppled by a military coup in 1991, and the new government began a
campaign of beating and killing those perceived to be Aristide support-
ers. Haitians who attempted to flee to the United States were picked up
by the Coast Guard and given perfunctory interviews. Only about a third
of all the refugees who were interdicted during this time were "screened
in" as having credible fears of persecution. The George H. W. Bush Ad-
ministration resumed the practice of forced repatriation for those Hai-
tians who had been "screened out," but legal challenges led to a judicially
ordered suspension of this policy. With hundreds of Haitians still aboard
Coast Guard cutters, the majority of whom had been "screened out," the
U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo was opened to house them. Both the
"screened-in" and the "screened-out" Haitians were detained in squalid
camps surrounded by barbed wire and informed that their detention would
be indefinite. They were denied access to counsel and simply left waiting
in what were effectively prisons.
In 1992, with the numbers of fleeing Haitians soaring into the thou-
sands, President Bush issued what has since become known as the "Ken-
nebunkport Order," which mandated the immediate return of any refugee
attempting to reach the United States by sea from Haiti (p. 129). This policy
on its face seemed to violate the Convention. The Bush administration
rationalized this direct return policy by arguing that the successful en-
trance of any intercepted Haitians would encourage a flood of economic
migrants to undertake voyages that would endanger their own lives and
overwhelm Coast Guard resources. The administration also widely publi-
cized its impression that most Haitians were not fleeing genuine persecu-
tion, but rather were merely in search of better economic prospects. Addi-
tionally, the public perception that many Haitians were HIV-positive played
a significant role in amassing support for this policy (pp. 56-57).
Goldstein focuses on the story of one Haitian woman who was suc-
cessfully "screened in" at Guantanamo only to find herself denied entry
to the United States when she tested positive for HIV (pp. 112-14). Yvonne
Pascal (a pseudonym) and her husband had been democracy activists in
Haiti. One night soldiers came to Yvonne's home and beat her so badly with
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rifle butts, boots, and fists that she miscarried on the floor in a pool of
blood. Yvonne felt she would be killed the next time the soldiers came
for her and also feared that she was endangering her two children by re-
maining in Haiti, so she squeezed into a severely overcrowded boat and
began the long, arduous journey to the United States. Eventually inter-
cepted by the Coast Guard, the passengers were taken aboard a cutter and
their boat was blown up. Yvonne was interviewed shortly after her arrival
in Guantanamo and was determined to have a credible fear of persecution.
She was then tested for HIV and was told that she was positive. Because
of her HIV status, Yvonne was told that she would be indefinitely de-
tained in Guantanamo rather than sent to the United States as she had ex-
pected. She was not informed of the details of her condition or what kind
of treatment she would need. The group of Yale students, led by Profes-
sor Harold Koh and assisted by numerous other lawyers, had two sepa-
rate cases to develop: one challenging President Bush's direct return pol-
icy, and the other challenging the blood testing of "screened-in" Haitians
without the benefit of counsel or other procedural safeguards, as well as
the subsequent denial of parole to these detainees.
While the Supreme Court upheld the direct return policy,7 the Yale
team prevailed in the Eastern District of New York in the second case,8
and Yvonne and other HIV-positive detainees were granted entry into the
United States (pp. 287, 291). The government had argued that because
Guantanamo was not within the United States, U.S. laws-including con-
stitutional rights to due process-simply did not apply. Judge Sterling
Johnson expressed his disbelief that any person detained through U.S.
actions could be subjected to arbitrary and capricious conduct merely
because they were held outside of the country (p. 276). However, Judge
Johnson's decision was ultimately vacated (p. 300). Guantanamo was not
shut down, as the students involved in the case had hoped, but instead
went on to become the present-day detention site for so-called "enemy com-
batants."
In an eerie repetition of history, the "enemy combatant" detainees
shipped to Guantanamo were, like the Haitian detainees before them,
denied the protections of U.S. laws, even though their very presence in
Guantanamo was a direct consequence of the exercise of U.S. law. Then,
as now, although the U.S. exercises sovereign power in its arrest and de-
tainment of alleged enemy combatants, it simultaneously disclaims the
power (and obligation) to protect the basic rights of human beings under
its jurisdiction.
The due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment were not
designed to protect only the morally upstanding, the innocent, or those with
I See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
' See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (vacated
by Stipulated Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb 22, 1994)).
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citizenship. The plain language of the Fifth Amendment is that "No
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law" 9-- not refugees, not migrants, and especially not those who are
suspected or accused of committing a crime. If one reads the Fifth Amend-
ment this way, the properly universal aspect of due process is not inci-
dental to liberal democracy; it is essential to it. This is what could be called
the radically Kantian or even the radically Christian principle of the
law-all humans should be treated with basic respect and dignity whether
they deserve it or not-and to evaluate a human being according to whether
he or she possess traits we admire, or even according to the evil he or she
may have done, is nothing other than the negation of that principle.?° On
this reading, due process guarantees the form of respect to all human be-
ings, and this is at least as vital, if not more so, to the ethical and existen-
tial intelligibility of those who carry out the law as much as it is to the
welfare of those upon whom the law is carried out.
The dangers of abandoning the form of this essential respect in order
to counter those who do not share this respect-who commit atrocities and
seek to destroy the very principle of liberal democracy-can be thought
of in terms of Nietzsche's deceptively simple warning from Beyond Good
and Evil: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he
does not become a monster."" It is not merely a question of consistency;
rather, it is a deeper metaphysical question about what remains if you
sacrifice everything. When we take exception to that which is essential to
democracy-even and especially for reasons of protecting democracy-
we take exception to democracy itself. As Zilek points out, the ominous
implication of John Ashcroft's claim that "terrorists use America's free-
dom as a weapon against us" is that "in order to defend 'us,' we should
limit our freedoms.""2 But if we do this, we effect mere reaction or re-
taliation, rather than preserving the necessary foundation for the return of
real democracy. In fact, by taking exception to what we wish to preserve,
we turn our backs on the possibility of that return. This concern is height-
ened when the exception is taken in a self-perpetuating context, for ex-
ample, in the war against terror, a war that the U.S. government admits
may be unending. In such situations, the exception is destined to become
the rule.
Another reason the state of exception is antithetical to democracy is
that it involves the exercise of sovereign power. According to Agamben,
sovereign power is the power to decide the state of exception; the sover-
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
10 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 1993) (1785).
11 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF
THE FUTURE 89 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage International Publishers 1989) (1886).
12 SLAVOJ ZIEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL: FIVE ESSAYS ON SEPTEM-
BER 11 AND RELATED DATES 107 (2002).
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eign is one who decides both what falls within and what falls outside its
power. 3 John Locke offered perhaps the easiest way to conceive of why
this power cannot comport with democracy. Locke perceived that the great-
est danger to good and just government was arbitrariness. He believed
that the power to exercise absolute and capricious power constitutes the
very essence of despotism. Something must intervene between the intense
and arbitrary passions of the individual and the subjects whom he wishes
to control or punish. For Locke, that something is the system of ordered
government, or what he termed the social contract. Locke's notion of the
social contract is built around the belief that no agent should have the power
to place another human being into his absolute and arbitrary power. If an
agent is allowed to have that power, there is no democracy, only tyr-
anny.' 4
Agamben resurrects the ancient Roman designation of the "homo
sacer" (literally, sacred man) to demonstrate the absolute and arbitrary
power of the sovereign. 5 In ancient Roman law, homo sacer designated a
person who could be killed with impunity. Killing a homo sacer was not
considered homicide, and his death also bore no sacrificial value. Agam-
ben writes that the homo sacer is excluded from society's recognition or
protection, and that his existence consists of "bare life," a life stripped of
dignity or basic human rights.' 6 Agamben gives many modern-day exam-
ples of homo sacer, the most vivid of which is the "Muselmann." The
term "Muselmann" was concentration camp slang for an inmate who had
lost the will to live, who seemed to exist in a grey area between life and
death, a walking corpse. A Muselmann was someone who had been bro-
ken down by the absolute and arbitrary power exerted upon him by the
soldiers and commandants who might on one day bring him extra food
and blankets and the next day torture him. The Nazis perfected the art of
the perpetual state of exception; the concentration camp itself was an
exception, with the inhabitants excluded from all law. This is fundamen-
tally different from being punished by the law; the inmates were not
prisoners in any normal juridical sense, but rather were outside the law,
beyond the reach of the protection of the form of the law, completely
subject to the whims of their captors. 7
Agamben draws a parallel between the legal status of concentration
camp inmates and the status of those detained under the original Patriot
Act of October 2001. "What is new about President Bush's order," he
11 See AGAMBEN, supra note 3, at 35.
'4See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing 1980) (1689).
15 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford University Press 1998) (1995).
16 See id.
17 In an interesting linguistic irony, the German word "Musulmann" literally translates
into "Muslim," although the slang term did not of course refer to actual Muslims in the
camps.
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writes, "is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus
producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being .... Neither
prisoners nor persons accused, but simply 'detainees,' they are the object
of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the
temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed
from the law and from judicial oversight."' 8 Ziiek provides his own ex-
ample of the United States acting as sovereign in relation to numerous
present-day manifestations of homo sacer by referring to the confusion
of Afghani citizens after September 11, who did not know if American
war planes flying overhead would drop food or bombs. 9 The United
States could choose to be both the humanitarian and the aggressor, ac-
cording to no set principle or consistent form. Those over whom the United
States could exercise this power were completely vulnerable to which-
ever choice was made. The U.S. government arguably maintained the
same relationship with the Haitian detainees at Guantanamo-sometimes
the camp officials would provide very good care and treatment to the in-
habitants, but at other times the officials treated them very badly and kept
the camps in terrible condition. Either way, the detainees were com-
pletely subject to the whims of those who oversaw the camps.
The concepts of sovereignty and exception can also help explain the
widely contradictory reports of the treatment of enemy combatants at
Guantanamo and the prisoners of Abu Ghraib. On the one hand, U.S. offi-
cials report that the camp inhabitants are given copies of the Koran, pro-
vided halal meals, and allowed to pray three times a day;2' on the other
hand, there are reports of torture, abuse, and humiliation on a truly horrific
scale.21 Again the power of the sovereign is clear: the sovereign can de-
cide what falls outside of the law, and that which falls outside the law can
be subjected to the most generous of gestures or to the cruelest of tortures.
On the subject of torture, recent liberal attempts to put "torture on
the table" highlight yet another aspect of sovereign power instating the
exception, and illustrate perhaps better than anything else the toll on hu-
manity that it exacts. Alan Dershowitz has famously opined that he is
"not in favor of torture, but if you're going to have it, it should damn well
have court approval."22 The gist of his argument for legalizing torture fol-
lows the familiar liberal logic that if something bad is going to be done,
it is better for it to be out in the open so as to prevent the worst excesses.
Dershowitz is fond of positing the "ticking bomb scenario," in which he
Is AGAMBEN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
19 Slavoj Zilek, Are We in a War? Do We Have an Enemy?, LONDON REV. BOOKS, May
23, 2002, at 3.
20 Press Release, American Forces Press Service, Rumsfeld Defends Servicemembers
Accused of Running Gulag (June 1, 2005).
21 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
In 50-52, U.N. Doc. EICN.412006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006).
22 Zikek, supra note 19 (quoting Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, NEWS-
WEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45).
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justifies torture as the only means of obtaining information that would
save hundreds of lives. Zi~ek, in his critique of Dershowitz's position,
does not disagree with the sentiment that Dershowitz expresses in this
scenario. Ziek posits that we can all imagine that given such a specific
situation we might indeed resort to torture. Zilek's critique focuses squarely
on the way Dershowitz wants to turn this genuine exception into a state
of exception: "it is absolutely crucial that one does not elevate this des-
perate choice into a universal principle: given the unavoidable and brutal
urgency of the moment, one should simply do it."23 The reason for this,
Zilek emphatically insists, is that only by refusing to elevate an action
we were brutally compelled to make can we retain "the sense of guilt, the
awareness of the inadmissibility of what we have done."24
The inhumanity of the state of exception does not necessarily lie in
the act of making an exception. It is possible that there are times that we
are forced to commit violence, and deny the humanity of another, to pre-
serve peace or save lives. But even if this can be shown to be necessary,
such measures remain inadmissible and unjustifiable in the realm of the
law. By formalizing and justifying the extreme measures we might be
compelled to take in order to save innocent lives or defend democracy-
by writing it into our law and rendering explicit our sovereign power-
we absolve ourselves of guilt and anaesthetize ourselves to the horror of
what we have done. The state of exception allows us to take refuge in a
systemized principle and point to it as our reason and our defense; in fact
we should be called upon to answer for every case of inhumanity perpe-
trated in the name of our country. The state of exception in the mode of ab-
solute sovereign power-in the mode of current government power-is
unacceptable precisely because it is only falsely temporary, only falsely
exceptional. A state of exception that denies the formal protection of ba-
sic human dignity of all persons will be neither temporary nor ultimately
protective of that dignity. If we continue to exercise our power through
the state of exception, and inscribe inhumanity into our law, we will lose
more than the war on terror.
23 Ziek, supra note 19.
24 ZI EK, supra note 12, at 103.
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